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The BlackEnergy malware targeting critical infrastructures has a long history. It evolved over time from
a simple DDoS platform to a quite sophisticated plug-in based malware. The plug-in architecture has a
persistent malware core with easily installable attack specific modules for DDoS, spamming, info-stealing,
remote access, boot-sector formatting etc. BlackEnergy has been involved in several high profile cyber
physical attacks including the recent Ukraine power grid attack in December 2015. This paper investigates
the evolution of BlackEnergy and its cyber attack capabilities. It presents a basic cyber attack model used
by BlackEnergy for targeting industrial control systems. In particular, the paper analyzes cyber threats
of BlackEnergy for synchrophasor based systems which are used for real-time control and monitoring
functionalities in smart grid. Several BlackEnergy based attack scenarios have been investigated by
exploiting the vulnerabilities in two widely used synchrophasor communication standards: (i) IEEE C37.118
and (ii) IEC 61850-90-5. Specifically, the paper addresses reconnaissance, DDoS, man-in-the-middle and
replay/reflection attacks on IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5. Further, the paper also investigates protection
strategies for detection and prevention of BlackEnergy based cyber physical attacks.
BlackEnergy, Malware, Cyber Attacks, Synchrophasors, Smart Grid, IEEE C37.118, IEC 61850-90-5.
1. INTRODUCTION
Synchrophasor based systems play a vital role in
real-time and wide-area monitoring, protection and
control in modern power grids. It involves measure-
ment of electrical quantities in real-time at different
points in the grid, time-stamped using a common
precise time source (e.g., GPS) and transmitted to
the control center using a suitable communication
framework. Synchrophasor applications range from
simple grid dynamics visualization/recording to pro-
tection in distributed generation and synchronous
islanding (Schweitzer et al. (2011)). At present,
two communication frameworks are available for
synchrophasor technology: IEEE C37.118 and IEC
61850-90-5. Both have their own unique features
and limitations (Khan et al. (2016)). Due to in-
volvement of critical infrastructure in synchrophasor
based systems and possible transmission of data
over insecure wide-area network, a strong protection
mechanism against cyber attacks is necessary.
The role of malware in modern sophisticated multi-
stage cyber attacks cannot be ignored. The success
of a cyber attack depends on the attacker’s ability
to install malware on a targeted system without
being noticed by the system owner. The time a
malware can disguise itself and persist inside an
infected system is also an important factor for
successful cyber attacks. BlackEnergy evolved as
one of the most sophisticated and modular malware
for targeting critical infrastructures since its first
discovery. Originally designed for Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attacks, BlackEnergy evolved into
a plug-in based architecture easing the development
of new attack-specific modules for espionage, DDoS,
spam and fraud. BlackEnergy has been involved in
several major cyber attacks including coordinated
DDoS attack on Georgia’s finance, military and
government agencies (Hollis (2011)), fraudulent
bank transactions and the Ukraine power grid.
Its concealment ability inside an infected system
is evident from the US Department of Homeland
Security revelation in 2014 that the software
controlling several national critical infrastructures
remained compromised by BlackEnergy since 2011
(ThreatSTOP (2016)).
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Based on the capabilities and success stories of
BlackEnergy, it is also a major threat for synchropha-
sor applications. Any cyber attack on synchrophasor
based systems can lead to extreme consequences
including blackout, financial loss and physical dam-
age to the grid. This paper investigates key features
and capabilities of BlackEnergy and analyzes threats
against synchrophasor based control and monitoring
systems. It presents a basic attack model used
previously in BlackEnergy based cyber attacks and
analyzes it for synchrophasor technology. In partic-
ular, this paper investigates vulnerabilities in both
IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 synchropha-
sor communication frameworks which could be ex-
ploited through cyber attacks including reconnais-
sance, DDoS, Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) and replay
attacks. The paper presents several attack scenarios
which alone or in combination could severely impact
monitoring and control functionalities of synchropha-
sor applications. The aim of paper is to investigate
potential BlackEnergy threats which could aid the
development of cyber security solutions. Based on
presented attack scenarios, this paper also presents
possible protection strategies for prevention or miti-
gation of BlackEnergy based cyber attacks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents background and related work
from literature. Section 3 presents formal analysis of
BlackEnergy variants evolved over time. Section 4
analyzes threats of BlackEnergy for synchrophasor
based systems by demonstrating different possible
attack scenarios. Section 5 presents possible
protection and prevention strategies. Finally, Section
6 concludes the paper.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This section presents background and related work
on (i) synchrophasor technology and its security
challenges and (ii) history of cyber attacks utilizing
BlackEnergy.
2.1. Synchrophasor Technology
Synchrophasor technology is used for real-time grid
monitoring and control (Schweitzer et al. (2011)).
It tracks power system dynamics in real time and
enables taking prompt actions when necessary.
Fig. 1 depicts a generic synchrophasor based
system consisting of the following basic components:
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), Phasor Data
Concentrators (PDCs), communication network and
control center. The PMUs are placed at different
points in the grid and measure voltage and current
waveforms in real-time which are transmitted to
the control center. They are equipped with GPS
antenna for time-stamping synchrophasor data
before transmission. The PDC is a device that
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Figure 1: Generic synchrophasor communication system.
receives data from multiple PMUs, aggregates it
based on GPS timestamps and sends as a single
output stream. The PDC input streams may be
originating from PMUs or PDCs or both. The control
center processes data for real-time grid monitoring,
control or simply archive for post-analysis in case of
any disaster.
Synchrophasor technology requires a suitable com-
munication framework for transmitting grid status
information in real-time over a wide area network
(Martin (2013)). IEEE developed the IEEE 1344
standard which was improved over the time and
ultimately replaced by IEEE C37.118-2. Martin et al.
(2008) explains the evolution of IEEE standards and
highlights the key improvements over time. The IEEE
C37.118-2 has several limitations including (i) lack of
security mechanism, (ii) limited interoperability and
integration support and (iii) no defined transport pro-
tocol and multicast features. IEC recently established
a working group for development of a synchrophasor
standard. The group developed the IEC 61850-90-5
standard and also proposed a security mechanism
(Madani et al. (2015)). The security mechanism is
based on Group Domain Of Interpretation (GDOI)
that ensures highest level of security for synchropha-
sor communication. To protect communication from
cryptanalysis, GDOI periodically refreshes security
policies and keying material. However, IEC 61850-
90-5 adaptation is quite limited and most commer-
cially available PMUs still support IEEE C37.118.
Khan et al. (2016) presented detailed comparison of
IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5.
Laverty et al. (2013) presented an OpenPMU
project, the first open source PMU project that
integrates latest features and supports both IEEE
C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5. The literature mostly
focuses on vulnerabilities in IEEE C37.118 due
to lack of built-in security mechanism (Khan
et al. (2016)). Allgood et al. (2011) highlighted
that synchrophasors are transmitted over wide-
area networks and an insecure communication
protocol raises serious threats against potential
cyber attacks. Stewart et al. (2011) addressed
best practice strategies and explained the role
of Virtual Private Network (VPN) and firewall in
protection against cyber attacks. Morris et al. (2011)
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tested the resilience of PMUs against Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks and monitored their degree of
unresponsiveness when flooded with ARP requests
and IPv4 packets. The authors also performed
protocol mutation experiments and tested resilience
against malformed packets. Coppolino et al. (2014)
also augmented the work on PMU vulnerabilities
when using IEEE C37.118. Shepard et al. (2012)
addressed GPS spoofing that can severely impact
power system e.g., intentional tripping of generators
or physical damage to equipments. In short, cyber
attacks on a synchrophasor based system could lead
to extreme consequences. Several survey articles
(Yan et al. (2012), Boyer et al. (2009), Beasley et
al. (2014)) have addressed security challenges for
synchrophasors and smart grid in general.
An investigation is necessary to determine resilience
of IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 against insider
attacks based on BlackEnergy. Further, knowledge
of countermeasures is necessary to effectively
mitigate them.
2.2. History of Black Energy
The history of BlackEnergy and its involvement in
different cyber attacks is depicted in Fig. 2. It was
first discovered by Arbor Networks (Nazario (2007))
as a simple HTTP based botnet. It is regarded
as BlackEnergy version 1 (BE1) and specifically
designed for DDoS attacks. It provides an attacker
an easy to control HTTP based bot with minimal
syntax for control functionalities. Arbor Networks
detected that most BE1 Command & Control (C&C)
servers were located in Malaysia and Russia. A
distinguishing feature of BE1 DDoS is its capability
to target more than one destination IP address
per hostname (Nazario (2007)). This makes the
coordinated DDoS much more effective even if the
target is using DNS load balancing. The bot also
uses encryption at runtime to prevent detection by
anti-virus software. The victims of BE1 are of two
types: (i) several distributed compromised systems
with BE1 Trojan for launching coordinated DDoS,
and (ii) the end targeted system of DDoS attack.
The connection between both types of victims was
unclear. Arbor Networks identified 27 active DDoS
networks based on BE1 Trojan located in Malaysia
and Russia, whereas, their main targets were also
located in Russian IP address space.
It is widely believed that BE1 was used for
a DDoS attack on Georgia in 2008 during the
Russian-Georgian war. However, there is insufficient
information to prove this speculation. The attack
was highly successful resulting in 54 websites
inaccessible (Hollis (2011)). The attack left Georgia’s
government, military, finance and news agencies
unable to communicate with citizens from the
affected areas. It is believed that reconnaissance
attack took place several weeks prior to actual
alleged Russian cyberspace DDoS attack.
In 2010, BlackEnergy version 2 (BE2) was discov-
ered with new espionage, spam and fraud capabili-
ties. SecureWorks research team revealed that BE2
was involved in stealing financial and authentication
data from Russian banks (Russian botnets targeting
local banks) (ThreatSTOP (2016)). SecureWorks fur-
ther revealed that BE2 has a modular design that
uses plugins for carrying out a specific malicious
activity without re-writing completely new code. After
stealing authentication data, BE2 utilized a DDoS
plug-in against the same bank to take authentication
system offline for customers and distract them from
noticing the fraudulent transactions. Further, BE2
was also accompanied with a plug-in designed to
destroy the filesystem on compromised machine.
BlackEnergy is also a major threat to critical in-
frastructures. US Department of Homeland Security
revealed in 2014 that the software controlling sev-
eral national critical infrastructures including nuclear
plants, electric grids, water filtration systems and
oil and gas pipelines had been compromised by
BlackEnergy since 2011 (ThreatSTOP (2016)). F-
Secure labs researched two BlackEnergy samples in
2014. The main victim of first sample was a political
website in Ukraine while NATO headquarters in Bel-
gium was the main target for the second sample. In
the same year, ESET also researched more than 100
BlackEnergy victims mostly in Poland and Ukraine
(ThreatSTOP (2016)).
The story of BlackEnergy continues and three
regional electric power distribution companies of
Ukraine experienced coordinated cyber attacks in
December 2015. The attacker utilized a new variant
of malware, BlackEnergy version 3 (BE3) for illegal
entry into the company’s computer and SCADA
systems. Attackers opened the breakers of seven
110 kV and 2335 kV substations resulting in blackout
for more than 225,000 people which took 6+ hours
to restore. To remove attack traces and elongate
the blackout period, attackers also utilized KillDisk
malware to wipe/erase several systems and corrupt
master boot records in all three companies. In
addition, a custom firmware was deployed for serial
to Ethernet converters that bricked the devices and
prevented technicians from restoring power until
converters were bypassed.
3. FORMAL ANALYSIS OF BLACKENERGY
The use of BlackEnergy for targeted attacks is
attributed to a Russian based cyber gang known
as Sandworm. Until now, the gang has targeted
NATO, several government organizations and critical
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Figure 2: History of Black Energy.
Table 1: BlackEnergy features and capabilities.
Feature BE1 BE2 Lite BE3
GUI Build Tools X X X X
Plugin Support X X X
Denial of service X X X X
C2C Controller X X X X
AV Obfuscation X X X X
Kernel rootkit X X
x64 support X X
bypass driver signing X
Reside only in memory X
rundll X X
Detection of virtual environment X
Anti-debugging methods X
Detect security countermeasures X
infrastructures. Sandworm uses spear phishing as
their preferred infection tactic and the latest version
of BlackEnergy as signature malware. BlackEnergy
enumerates all installed drivers on a system and
identifies those which are disabled. It randomly
selects a disabled driver, maliciously replaces it with
its own driver and enables it on the compromised
system. The driver needs to have a valid signature.
BlackEnergy bypasses such security features by
modifying system boot configuration data to enable
testing signatures and patches the user32.dll.mui or
bypasses the UAC through shim. Table 1 describes
how BlackEnergy features evolved over time and is
discussed in the following sections.
3.1. BlackEnergy 1
The BE1 is HTTP based botnet used for coordinated
DDoS attacks. It provides the attacker an easy to
control interface with minimal syntax and structure.
The BE1 botnet configurations are stored and loaded
from MySQL database (db.sql). Unlike traditional
botnets, it does not communicate with botnet master
using Internet Relay Chat (IRC). Further, BE1 lacks
the exploit functionalities and relies on external
tools to load the bot. Nazario (2007) observed that
most BE1 C&C servers were hosted in Russia
and Malaysia and attacking targets located in
Russia. BE1 botnet uses HTTP POST messages
to communicate with its controlling servers and
specifies the bot’s ID inside each message. Key
features of BE1 include: (i) ability to target more
than one IP address per hostname, (ii) a runtime
encrypter to prevent detection by antivirus software,
and (iii) disguises itself by hiding its processes
in a system driver (syssrv.sys). The BE1 bot has
three different types of commands: (i) DDoS attack
commands e.g., ICMP flood, TCP SYN flood, UDP
flood, HTTP get flood, DNS flood, etc, (ii) download
commands to fetch and launch a new or updated
executable from its server and (iii) control commands
e.g., stop (to freeze DDoS), wait (a placeholder) or
die (kill or exit).
3.2. BlackEnergy 2
BE2 is a superior version of BlackEnergy discovered
in 2010. The malware was completely rewritten and
evolved from basic DDoS specific architecture to a
modular framework. BE2 provided extended func-
tionalities with easily loadable attack-specific plugins
for espionage, fraud, stealing user credentials or
key logger, scanning network, sending spam and
more. BE2 is a superset of BE1 and also contains
plugin for the original DDoS functionality. The plugins
are downloaded/updated from its C&C servers on
compromised system in an encrypted format as
drivers. BE2 also contains a Trojan plugin that can
destroy the complete filesystem of a compromised
system on kill command (ThreatSTOP (2016)). The
capabilities of BE2 include: (i) execute local files,
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(ii) download and execute remote files, (iii) update
itself and plugins with C&C servers and (iv) die or
destroy. The plugins and update features of BE2
make it highly evasive with a much longer survival
time on compromised systems. If the bot is detected
by antivirus software, the attacker only rewrites the
discovered part and sends the update to bots.
3.3. BlackEnergy 3
The BE3 is highly simplified version of BE2,
first discovered in 2014. Compared to BE2, BE3
bears minor changes and uses a different protocol
for communication with its plugins (ThreatSTOP
(2016)). Further, the BE3 installer drops the
main DLL component directly into user processes
(specifically in svchost.exe) rather than using
driver/rootkit component as in BE2. BE3 was
also found scanning the internet for a specific
HMI, the GE Intelligent Platforms HMI/SCADA -
CIMPLICITY. The HMI was known to have a directory
traversal vulnerability in CimWebServer.exe (the
WebView component) which allows remote attackers
to execute arbitrary code via a crafted message to
TCP port 10212, (ZDI-CAN-1623). BE3 targeted this
service after detecting its network interface. Once it
detected an exploitable server, it has two options;
download devlist.cim or config.bak which would then
use to deploy BlackEnergy. Once on a system, BE3
scans the network and local machines for data to
exfiltrate.
3.4. BlackEnergy Lite
The BE Lite (also known as BE Mini) has different
build ID format, different plugin interface and has
much lighter footprint. Unlike BE2 and BE3, it does
not use a driver for loading the main DLL but instead
uses more standard way for loading DLLs (e.g.,
rundll32.exe). The configuration data of BE Lite is
stored as X.509 certificates unlike other BlackEnergy
variants which store in XML files.
4. SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR
SYNCHROPHASOR BASED APPLICATIONS
BlackEnergy is one of the most sophisticated
malware evolved over time and played key role
in several high profile cyber attacks on critical
infrastructures in the past. It is also a major threat to
synchrophasor technology which is particularly used
for monitoring and control of critical infrastructure.
Depending on the type of cyber attack on
synchrophasors, the potential impact could be
different. The BE3 with DDoS plugin could lead
to failure in a power grid leaving PMUs unable to
communicate with the control centers. BE3 with fs.dll
and dstr.dll plugins could destroy entire filesystem on
compromised system and leave devices completely
inoperable. BE3 with ps.dll and kd.dll plugins could
Reconnaissance
Weaponization
Malware
Injection
Concealment
Assault / 
Execution
Destroy
Figure 3: The anatomy of cyber attack.
provide an attacker key logging and password
stealing functionalities which could be necessary
for remote access to critical system components
e.g., the PMU, and alter the configurations. BE3
with scan.dll, vs.dll and rd.dll plugins could help
attacker scan the entire network and discover
the devices of interest from compromised system,
remotely access the compromised system and
launch MITM, replay or other traffic manipulation
attack on communication between PMUs and the
control center. Traffic manipulation attacks could
severely damage physical equipment and result in
complete shutdown of grid components.
Depending on the communication framework (IEEE
C37.118 or IEC 61850-90-5) used in a synchropha-
sor based system, BlackEnergy kill chain process
could be slightly different. This section presents a
basic cyber attack model derived from the analysis
of previous BlackEnergy based cyber attacks. Based
on the attack model, several attack scenarios have
been addressed in which BlackEnergy could play
lead-role in executing cyber attacks on synchropha-
sor based systems.
4.1. Basic Cyber Attack Model
A proper understanding of the anatomy of cyber
attack could help detect and prevent future attacks.
Fig. 3 illustrates steps involved in the launch of a
successful cyber attack based on BlackEnergy in
particular but equally applicable to any malware in
general.
4.1.1. Reconnaissance
It is the first step in any cyber attack to identify
and exploit vulnerabilities in the targeted system
including organizational structure, OS and software
types and version, security credentials and any
misconfigurations. It is the identification of a weak
initial target that is either inside or connected to the
targeted organization.
4.1.2. Weaponization
Once a weak target is identified, a weapon is pre-
pared for initial attack. Weaponization often means
trojanization of a genuine application, document or
file with malicious code. E.g., weaponization may
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exploit macros in Microsoft word document or use
PDF files in malicious way.
4.1.3. Malware Injection
The next step is injection of malware or weaponized
application/document into the targeted system. The
most common method is spear phishing i.e., sending
weaponized document as email attachment or link
to weaponized application in email by impersonating
it as a link for necessary updates of a genuine
application already installed on the system. The
BlackEnergy attack on Ukraine power companies
was based on spear phishing (ThreatSTOP (2016)).
Another common malware injection strategy is
pharming or driveby pharming i.e., redirecting
traffic to fraudulent website through exploiting
vulnerabilities in DNS server.
4.1.4. Concealment
Once malware is successfully injected and executed,
the next step is to disguise and remain undetected
by defense mechanisms on targeted system.
BlackEnergy successfully replaces genuine system
drivers to conceal itself. Concealment is necessary
to get enough time for attack preparation, testing and
validation before the final execution to achieve the
best possible results.
4.1.5. Assault
Assault is the actual execution of an attack based
on the BlackEnergy version and plugins used. The
concealed malware remains in contact with C&C
servers and executes the final attack only when
instructed e.g., coordinated DDoS attack on Georgia
(Hollis (2011)).
4.1.6. Destroy
Post attack after achieving objectives, the attacker
destroys all traces leaving behind no clues of attack
process. Cleaning logs and injecting mis-leading
information into the system could obfuscate forensic
team from revealing attack success reasoning. The
BlackEnergy attack on Ukraine power companies
used a KillDisk plugin to destroy the entire file
system, destroy forensic evidences and significantly
increase recovery time for power companies.
4.2. Coordinated DDoS Attack on
Synchrophasor-based System
The DDoS attack floods target systems with traffic
originating from potentially thousands of different
sources. The distributed nature makes it difficult
to differentiate between legitimate packets and
flood packets. Further, attack prevention cannot be
achieved by simply blocking packets from a single
origin IP. The DDoS attack leaves target system
irresponsive by consuming all of its processing
resources.
Several synchrophasor applications involve local
communication or use of secure VPNs which make
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2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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Figure 4: Coordinated DDoS Attack on IEEE C37.118
using BlackEnergy DDoS plugin.
DDoS attacks on a specific device difficult. The
attack scenario in Fig. 4 is limited to certain specific
synchrophasor applications involving transmission
over Internet without using VPN tunnels. It is similar
to the DDoS attack on Georgia (Hollis (2011)) and
consists of following steps:
Step:1 It involves reconnaissance, weaponization
and malware injection (i.e., BE3 with DDoS
plugin) steps of the attack model depicted in
Fig. 3.
Step:2 Execution of injected malware and conceal-
ment.
Step:3 The victim sends basic information about
compromised system to C&C servers.
Step:4 The attacker gets information about compro-
mised systems from C&C servers. It sends
commands (e.g., when to execute attack) to
C&C servers.
Step:5 C&C servers send attacker commands to
victims.
Step:6 The victims execute coordinated DDoS when
instructed by attacker through C&C servers.
Fig. 4 demonstrates DDoS by flooding ‘data’ mes-
sages; a specific IEEE C37.118 message carry-
ing actual synchrophasor measurements. Without
knowing PMU configurations, the botnets could not
construct correctly formated data messages. In case
of IEC 61850-90-5, the botnets will flood Sam-
pled Value (SV) packets. However, botnet operators
will most likely lack knowledge about security poli-
cies and keying material. Thus, incorrectly formated
packets or packets with invalid signatures will be
immediately discarded by the control server without
being fully processed. This results in the reduced
strength of DDoS attack. For a much stronger DDoS
6
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Figure 5: Reconnaissance/Eavesdropping attack scenario
on synchrophasor System.
attack with correctly formated flood packets, a multi-
stage attack is addressed in Section 4.6.
4.3. Reconnaissance/Eavesdropping Attack on
Synchrophasor-based System
Reconnaissance is unauthorized discovery of net-
work and equipment configurations, system topol-
ogy and system dynamics. Since synchrophasors
carry real-time dynamics about the power system,
eavesdropping could reveal critical information to
the attacker. Reconnaissance itself is not harmful
but can help discover system vulnerabilities, steal
secrets (e.g., login credentials for remote access
devices) and can help determine the right time for
more severe attacks through the knowledge of sys-
tem dynamics.
A reconnaissance attack could be launched by
eavesdropping on network traffic or by directly
accessing the physical device. Depending on the
attack strategy, the attacker could use BlackEnergy
with one or more plugins such as scan.dll (i.e.,
network scanning), kl.dll (i.e., key-logger), vs.dll (i.e.,
network discovery & remote execution), ss.dll (i.e.,
screenshot), ps.dll (i.e., password stealer), tv.dll (i.e.,
teamviewer) or rd.dll (i.e., remote desktop). Fig.
5 depicts the attack scenario for reconnaissance
based on BlackEnergy and consists of the following
steps:
Step:1-5 Corresponds to steps 1-5 as in Fig. 4.
Step:6 The victim scans for an internal server or
HMI device that has the ability to access/control
field devices. Attacker uses remote execution
vulnerability to implant BlackEnergy on internal
server. The internal server opens a SSH
backdoor and listens on specific port. This
provides the attacker more flexibility to control
internal server/HMI.
Control Center
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Attacker/Compromised PC
Gateway PMU
MAC = BB:BB:BB:BB:BB:BB
IP = 192.168.1.55
MAC = AA:AA:AA:AA:AA:AA
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Figure 6: Traffic diversion based on ARP spoofing.
Step:7 The actual reconnaissance attack execu-
tion by remotely accessing and monitoring the
device or sniffing and monitoring its traffic
(e.g., using traffic diversion mechanism demon-
strated in Fig. 6).
The attacker will acquire PMU configurations (i.e.,
necessary for IEEE C37.118) or security credential
for IEC 61850-90-5 by either remotely accessing the
PMU from a compromised server or by monitoring
its traffic. Such information will also enable an
attacker to control PMU operations. To eavesdrop
on traffic, the compromised internal server needs to
implement local traffic diversion. Fig. 6 depicts the
traffic diversion scenario based on ARP spoofing,
which is one possible approach described as follows:
Step:1 Normal operations scenario when no traffic
diversion is activated.
Step:2 The attacker broadcast Gratuitous ARP
inside local network to update ARP caches of
all LAN devices. Gratuitous ARP associates
PMU or gateway IP (i.e., one way traffic
diversion) or both IP addresses (i.e., two way
traffic diversion) with attacker’s MAC address.
Step:3 Final delivery of packets inside local network
is based on MAC address. Thus, all traffic
to/from PMU goes to attacker who then
forwards to correct destination.
The attack scenario in Fig. 5 is also very similar
to recent BlackEnergy attack on Ukraine power
companies (Lee et al. (2016)). During step 6,
BlackEnergy malware opened an SSH backdoor by
listening on port 6789. During step 7, attackers
altered configurations of inverters and created
blackout. The attackers took an additional step by
executing KillDisk plugin to format/destroy the entire
file system of internal server. This left the attack
impact over a longer period and more time and
efforts were required to recover the system from
attack. The attackers also launched a DDoS attack
(similar to Fig. 4) on control center in parallel to
prevent customers from reporting the blackout.
4.4. Man In The Middle Attack on
Synchrophasor-based System
The MITM attack hijacks communication between
two devices and makes them believe that they
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Command: Stop Data Transmission
Attacker
Figure 7: MITM attack: Hijacking of IEEE C37.118
communication.
are connected to each other directly. Instead, the
attacker lies in the middle, sniffs and manipulates
packets in transit. In a successful MITM attack, the
attacker can alter packets in transit or drops them or
injects new packets.
For a MITM attack, the attacker first needs
to get access inside supervisory network by
compromising an internal server (i.e., similar to
Steps 1-6 in Fig. 5). The next step is to
implement traffic diversion (depicted in Fig. 6)
to get access to packets in both directions.
Further steps after traffic diversion depend on the
communication framework: IEEE C37.118 or IEC
61850-90-5. The basic scenario to successfully
hijack IEEE C37.118 communication and perform
MITM attack is depicted in Fig. 7. To initiate
communication with PMU, the control center sends
a command message to request configurations
from PMU. The PMU replies with a configuration
message that contains information about the
PMU as well as necessary decoding information
for the upcoming synchrophasor data messages.
Afterwards, the control center sends another
request to the PMU to start the transmission of
synchrophasor data messages. If an attacker sits in
the middle by implementing traffic diversion, it cannot
understand/decode synchrophasor data messages
without the knowledge of PMU configurations.
Thus, the attacker sends command message to
PMU to request the configurations. After storing
configurations, the configuration message from PMU
should be dropped and prevented from traveling to
the control center. At this point, the attacker can
successfully decode synchrophasor data messages
in transit and manipulate/modify them before being
forwarded to the control center. An attacker
may also interrupt communication by sending
command message to PMU to stop transmission of
synchrophasors and generate packets from its own
and transmit to the control center. For synchrophasor
control applications, it can cause severe damage
to physical equipments and financial loss as the
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Figure 8: MITM attack: Hijacking of IEC 61850-90-5
communication.
deceived control center unintentionally performs
decisions on incorrect data.
Unlike IEEE C37.118, the IEC 61850-90-5 com-
munication cannot be hijacked easily due to GDOI
security mechanism. As depicted in Fig. 8, both
the PMU and control center first need to acquire
security policies and keying material from the Key
Distribution Center (KDC) through specific GDOI
exchanges. The acquired security credentials then
enable the PMU and control center to securely com-
municate with each other. For an attacker to play a
MITM role, it needs to hijack both GDOI exchanges
as well as IEC 61850-90-5 communication. Both
GDOI exchanges and IEC 61850-90-5 messages
are encrypted leaving the attacker unable to decrypt
and manipulate the messages in transit. To acquire
security credentials for decryption, the attacker may
adopt one of two strategies: (i) compromise the
PMU as well and steal security credentials, or (ii)
persist inside the substation network until a new
PMU or existing disconnected PMU (e.g., due to
maintenance) reconnects to the network and authen-
ticates with the KDC. The authentication phase with
KDC can be successfully hijacked by an attacker by
a MITM attack on GDOI authentication exchanges
(e.g., MITM attack on Diffie Hellman authentication
mechanism). The attacker masquerades as the PMU
to the KDC, and as the KDC to the PMU. Thus,
two authentications take place: (i) between PMU
and attacker and (ii) between attacker and KDC.
Once GDOI phase 1 (i.e., Diffie Hellman) has been
compromised, an attacker can successfully decrypt
and manipulate IEC 61850-90-5 packets in transit
between PMU and control center by using acquired
security credentials.
4.5. Replay/Reflection Attack on
Synchrophasor-based System
The procedure and requirements of replay/reflection
attack are similar to the MITM attack as addressed
in Section 4.4. It can hide the real-time power sys-
tem dynamics by storing/recording communication
between a PMU and control center and plays it
back to the control center later on. It can lead
to incorrect decisions by the control center due to
processing out-dated packets. It is particularly risky
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Figure 9: Strong DDoS attack based on two-stage interim
attacks utilizing BlackEnergy plugins for credential theft
and DDoS.
for real-time synchrophasor control applications such
as synchronous islanding and could cause physical
damage to substation resulting in local blackout.
For replay attack on IEEE C37.118, the attacker
does not need to acquire configurations from PMU.
However, the Second Of Century (SOC) count inside
each recorded packet should be adjusted by attacker
before replaying to the control center. For a replay
attack on IEC 61850-90-5, the attacker still needs to
acquire security credentials as addressed in Section
4.4. The attacker needs to decrypt packets and up-
date session PDU numbers and security information
inside each packet before transmitting to control
center. This step is necessary as the GDOI security
credentials have certain validity and replaced pe-
riodically upon expiry. Otherwise, the packets with
expired security credentials will be silently ignored
by the control center without processing.
4.6. Multistage DDoS Attack on
Synchrophasor-based System
As addressed in Section 4.2, the packets in simple
DDoS for IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 are
partially processed by control center and ignored.
To launch a strong DDoS attack by enabling
control center to process flood packets completely,
knowledge of PMU configurations for IEEE C37.118
and security credentials for IEC 61850-90-5 is strictly
necessary. This requires a multi-stage attack utilizing
BlackEnergy DDoS plugin along with other plugins
(e.g., scan.dll, ps.dll, re.dll, etc) for information
stealing. The first stage attack is on the substation
network by compromising an internal server and
stealing necessary information from PMU. In second
stage, DDoS botnets utilize stolen information and
launch coordinated DDoS attack on control server.
The two stage attack scenario on synchrophasor
based system (depicted in Fig. 9) consists of the
following steps:
Step:1-6 Corresponds to steps 1-6 as in Fig. 5.
Step:7 Attacker implements traffic diversion to gain
access to PMU messages.
Step:8 Attacker through reconnaissance finds the
PMU configurations for IEEE C37.118 commu-
nication framework which is necessary to build
and decode synchrophasor data messages. In
case of IEC 61850-90-5, security credentials
are also hacked as described in Fig. 8.
Step:9 Necessary synchrophasor information is
returned to the C&C servers.
Step:10 Attacker instructs C&C servers to provide
stolen synchrophasor information to DDoS
botnets when discovered.
Step:11-15 Corresponds to steps 1-5 as in Fig. 4.
Step:16 The DDoS botnets use stolen synchropha-
sor information provided by the C&C servers
and build correctly formated IEEE C37.118 or
IEC 61850-90-5 messages and flood on the
control server for a very strong DDoS attack.
5. PROTECTION STRATEGIES
A basic level of protection can be achieved with
anti-virus software and firewall configurations. An
updated anti-virus software may detect known
variants of BlackEnergy but cannot guarantee
protection against its future updates. Also firewalls
block incoming connections at non-open ports
but are not effective in case of spear phishing
emails. Sandboxes can also provide protection while
testing/executing unverified applications/documents.
This section presents protection strategies in a
generalized way with flexibility in mind to tackle with
unforeseen future behavior changes in BlackEnergy.
5.1. Black-Listing and White-Listing
Connections
The blacklisting and whitelisting of external destina-
tion IP addresses can be one of the most effective
protection strategy against BlackEnergy. The unfore-
seen future updates of BlackEnergy make impossi-
ble to create a blacklist for its C&C servers. Instead, a
whilelist of trusted destinations should be created for
PMU and control center. Such defense may be local
to device or system-wide. A device’s local defense
system will monitor its inbound and outbound traffic
and check with the whilelist. Whereas, a system-
wide defense system will monitor the entire network
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traffic. Blocking inbound as well as outbound con-
nections which are not specified in whitelist will pre-
vent BlackEnergy victim (e.g., if any compromised
through spear phishing emails or infected websites)
to communicate with the C&C servers. This leaves
the attacker unable to communicate with victim in
order to execute the attack. This strategy will become
ineffective if any future variant of BlackEnergy per-
forms its job without requiring communication with
C&C servers.
5.2. Event Monitoring and Logging
Event monitoring and logging for both users and
SCADA applications could help detect or identify
security breaches. First, a baseline should be
defined for defense system based on device routine
activities. The baseline for a synchrophasor based
system can be PMU configurations, messaging rate,
drivers and firmware updates etc. An alert should
be raised if non-scheduled event such as driver or
firmware update or installation is detected. Further,
the logs can also be used for forensic analysis in
case of cyber attack.
5.3. End-to-End Encryption
The PMUs are specialized devices and the likelihood
of direct infection by BlackEnergy is very low.
However, the malware can target a general purpose
office PC or any PC-based host (HMI, historian, etc)
in the control network and launch traffic hijacking,
MITM and replay attacks on PMU traffic. Such
attacks can be launched on unencrypted IEEE
C37.118 packets and GDOI security mechanism
in IEC 61850-90-5. The attacks can be easily
prevented if end-to-end encryption is used by
communicating devices without relying on external
KDC. Without the knowledge of security credentials,
the attacker cannot manipulate PMU traffic in transit.
However, this strategy brings more complexity and
communicating devices need to know security
credentials by some out of band method.
5.4. Remote Access to PMUs
Cyber attacks normally involve remote access to
field devices and altering their configurations e.g.,
cyber attack on Ukraine power companies remotely
opened breakers (Lee et al. (2016)). The specialized
devices like PMUs are better to be controlled locally
with remote access features disabled. Eliminating
network interface will prevent attacker to gain direct
access to PMUs. This strategy is particularly useful if
PMU communication is using end-to-end encryption
and its traffic cannot be manipulated in transit.
5.5. Protocol Specific Strategies
The defense mechanism on field devices should also
raise an alert if any non-routine packet is detected.
E.g., to implement reconnaissance or MITM attack
on IEEE C37.118, the compromised local system
requests configurations from PMU to understand the
data messages. These request packets are normally
spoofed with the genuine recipient IP address.
However, such activity should be marked suspicious
by a PMU as it has already provided configurations to
the recipient. For IEC 61850-90-5, the attacker may
attempt to disconnect a PMU from the KDC and then
attempt MITM on communication between the PMU
and KDC. The PMU should be suspicious on such
events and raise an alert. Further, the PMU should
also detect gratuitous ARP packets (i.e., used for
traffic diversion) and raise an alert.
6. CONCLUSIONS
BlackEnergy is one of the most sophisticated
malware in active development and has been used
in high profile cyber attacks on critical infrastructures.
Its concealing ability in infected systems, bypassing
of UAC settings, bypassing driver signing policy
and plugin nature of its recent variant increased
its scope to virtually unlimited cyber criminal
activities. A cyber attack may use more than one
plugin based on attacker intension where each
plugin performs a specific task e.g., scan.dll (i.e.,
network scanning), kl.dll (i.e., key-logger), vs.dll (i.e.,
network discovery & remote execution), ss.dll (i.e.,
screenshot), ps.dll (i.e., password stealer), si.dll (i.e.,
stealing information), rd.dll (i.e., remote desktop) etc.
This paper addressed BlackEnergy malware in de-
tail and highlighted its features and capabilities. It
analyzed how BlackEnergy can be utilized for target-
ing critical infrastructures. Particularly, threats were
analyzed for the synchrophasor technology which is
used for real-time monitoring and control in smart
grids. The paper demonstrated DDoS, reconnais-
sance, MITM and replay attacks on the commu-
nication frameworks used in synchrophasor based
systems. A successful DDoS attack could impair
real-time monitoring and control functionalities. The
reconnaissance attack could help attacker to launch
more sophisticated attacks by stealing configurations
and security credentials from PMU. The MITM and
replay attacks are most critical as they can leave con-
trol center performing decisions on incorrect data.
Based on the synchrophasor control application e.g.,
synchronous islanding, such attacks can cause se-
vere physical damage to grid and cause blackout.
The paper also addressed possible protection strate-
gies for shielding synchrophasor based systems
against BlackEnergy. Absolute protection against
BlackEnergy could not be guaranteed due to un-
foreseen future updates to its functionalities, plug-
ins/capabilities and infection strategy. However the
task can become more challenging for attackers if
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they must evade protection strategies such as Black-
listing/Whitelisting external IP addresses, end-to-
end communicating encryption, eliminating/disabling
network interface for field devices (e.g., PMUs).
Regular monitoring of system logs and events could
also help detect security breaches e.g., unscheduled
update/installation of driver or firmware.
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